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The European sovereign debt crisis is slowly turning into a euro crisis. 
Germany has a special responsibility for the resolution of this issue. As 
an exporting nation it is heavily dependent on stable economic condi-
tions in Europe, and for this reason the long-term stabilization of the 
euro is in a very fundamental way in its interests, even if this means 
making transfer payments in order to prevent the disintegration of the 
eurozone.
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I
A real euro crisis?
The eurozone is having to face up to the most 
serious test in its history. The rapidly rising le-
vel of public debt in certain member states is 
taking these countries to the verge of bankrupt-
cy. For a long time the debt issue did not have 
a significant influence on the euro exchange 
rate. However, since 2011 the value of the euro 
has been going down. From May to September 
2011 a euro was worth about US$1.46, but by 
the middle of January 2012 it had dropped to 
US$1.26.
At first sight a weak euro would seem to be a 
good thing for Germany as an exporting nation 
since it means that in other countries the price 
of German goods will go down. This will lead 
to an increase in the level of exports and in do-
mestic job security. However, a permanent de-
valuation of the euro also has its disadvantages 
as far as Germany is concerned. If international 
investors believe that the euro will be devalu-
ed even further, it will make them think twice 
about lending money to European states. This 
can be illustrated with the following example. 
If an investor from a non-euro country changes 
10,000 Swiss francs into euros in order to buy 
a one-year European government bond, he will 
incur a loss of 1,000 Swiss francs if the euro is 
devalued by 10 percent. In order to make up for 
this he will insist on higher interest rates. How-
ever, higher interest rates will make it virtually 
impossible for the heavily indebted eurozone 
countries to pay the interest due on their loans, sp
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II
Not an ideal state of affairs
The main reason for the high level of indebted-
ness of south European states is their lack of 
competitiveness. Before the introduction of the 
euro these countries were able to make up for 
technological disadvantages in the area of ma-
nufacturing with the help of flexible exchange 
rates. A country which had productivity pro-
blems simply devalued its currency, thereby 
overcoming some of the disadvantages of lower 
international competitiveness. The introduction 
of the euro meant that this option was no lon-
ger available. The renunciation of a currency of 
one’s own in conjunction with a lack of inter-
national competitiveness leads to a decline in 
a country’s exports, a rise in its imports, and 
a current account deficit. This mirrors a decli-
ne in the demand for a country’s products both 
at home and abroad, and this in turn leads to 
a decline in manufacturing and employment. 
The lower level of economic activity leads to a 
decrease in government revenues, and at the 
same time the financial support given to the 
unemployed leads to increased expenditure. 
Both of these things lead inexorably to an in-
crease in government debt.
Against the backdrop of these interdependent 
relationships, research carried out in the 1960s 
within the framework of the “theory of the op-
timum currency area” defined the conditions 
under which a number of different countries 
could form a monetary union. Membership 
of a monetary union is least problematical if 
Necessary Write-downs
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so that seems increasingly likely that these sta-
tes will become insolvent. And higher interest 
rates also pose a great problem for the German 
government. Currently Germany’s sovereign 
debt amounts to slightly more than €2,000 bil-
lion. It is true that at the moment the interest 
rates paid by the German government are ext-
remely low and to a certain extent actually ne-
gative. However, if fears about the devaluation 
of the euro were to push up interest rates by 
only one percent, it would mean an increase in 
interest payments of about €20 billion annually. 
Instability obviously makes everything more 
expensive. It is thus in a very fundamental way 
in Germany’s interests to bring the European 
debt crisis and the associated euro crisis to an 
end as swiftly as possible.
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the participating economies all have similar 
productivity levels and identical productivity 
growth rates. In this case it is not necessary 
to have a flexible exchange rate in order to 
bolster international competitiveness. As soon 
as a member of a monetary union lags behind 
with regard to productivity growth, it will be 
necessary to reduce manufacturing costs in 
ways that are not associated with technological 
progress. Here the main issue is of how one 
goes about reducing the prices for factors such 
as labour, land and capital that play a part in 
the manufacturing process. Since the interna-
tional capital markets are gradually developing 
into networks, it is very difficult for a single 
country to influence the level of interest rates. 
Furthermore, countries in a monetary union 
no longer have their own central banks, which 
means that national monetary policy is no lon-
ger available as an instrument with which one 
can influence interest rates. Thus a decrease 
in wages is of crucial importance when it co-
mes to reducing production costs and regai-
ning international competitiveness. If it proves 
impossible to implement lower wage levels as 
a result of societal constraints, a country with 
below-average productivity growth can prevent 
an increase in unemployment only if its wor-
kers are mobile and willing to move to coun-
tries in which there are more jobs. As a result 
of the mobility of labour unemployment does 
not actually increase in an economy with low 
productivity. And this means that there is no 
increase in government spending designed to 
reduce the impact of unemployment.
However, such prerequisites for a functioning 
monetary union do not exist in the eurozone. 
The mobility of labour within the euro area is 
very limited, and wage reductions are few and 
far between. But this is not particularly sur-
prising, for even within Germany itself these 
mechanisms do not function very well. Twenty 
years after reunification unemployment in the 
new federal states is still higher than in the old 
federal states (Federal Employment Agency 
2012, p. 48). Economic differences – measured 
by things such as unit labour costs, economic 
growth and unemployment – also exist in the 
US, though migration, price flexibility, vertical 
financial transfers and factors such as langua-
ge, culture and common institutions play a far 
greater role than in the eurozone (see Diek-
mann, Menzel and Thomae 2012).
III
The need for compromises
So how can the level of sovereign debt in Euro-
pe be reduced? First of all the European states 
must quickly come up with a credible strategy 
for the consolidation of their public budgets. Na-
tional and international comparisons show that 
successful consolidation processes are based 
on spending cuts and on a stabilization of or an 
increase in government revenues.
The unavoidable cuts in government expenditu-
re are a kind of balancing act. The spending 
cuts must be large enough in order to make 
a genuine contribution to debt reduction. But 
they must not be excessive, since a reduction 
in government spending can also have unwan-
ted side-effects. Lower government spending 
can have a negative effect on urgently needed 
investments in our future, especially in the 
areas of education, health and environmental 
protection. Moreover, a reduction in govern-
ment spending is bound to weaken demand 
in general, and will thus have negative conse-
quences for production and employment. This 
contradicts the whole point of what budgetary 
consolidation is trying to achieve. The decrease 
in government revenues, which is a result of 
the decline in economic activity, and the incre-
ase in government spending, which is neces-
sitated by increased unemployment, lead to a 
situation where government indebtedness goes 
up instead of down.
However, a reduction in government spending 
does not necessarily have to lead to a decline 
in economic growth. If a country’s public debt 
continues to rise inexorably, its citizens will no 
doubt assume that sooner or later the govern-
ment will have to increase the level of taxation 
in order to deal with the problem of indebted-
ness. This could lead to a rise in the savings 
rate and capital flight. Both would reduce the 
level of employment on account of a drop in 
consumer demand and a decline in investment 
activity. Budgetary consolidation makes such 
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precautionary measures superfluous. Rising 
consumer demand would give companies an 
incentive to raise their investment levels. And 
increased consumer demand and investment 
activity would lead to more employment oppor-
tunities. These theoretical considerations are 
called “non-Keynesian effects” and have been 
substantiated by a series of empirical studies 
(see Petersen 2006 for a more detailed discus-
sion of this issue).
This is why budgetary consolidation and job 
protection measures do not necessarily cont-
radict each other. Thus in the light of current 
European indebtedness and uncertainty about 
future fiscal policy it cannot be ruled out that 
a moderate reduction in government spending 
and a concurrent stabilization of government 
revenues will actually generate the trust which 
is required to create positive expectations and 
a positive atmosphere as a basis for economic 
growth.
Although there is obviously a pressing need to 
consolidate public budgets, it is important to 
bear in mind the actual economic imbalances 
within the eurozone. Of vital importance for 
the enduring stability of government finances 
is a high level of employment. As long as cer-
tain members of the eurozone are not compe-
titive in international terms – and currently 
this applies primarily to Greece, Portugal and 
Spain – they will be burdened with a high level 
of unemployment, and this will have a negative 
impact on public finances.
Two important points emerge with regard to 
the concurrent and much-needed consolidation 
of public budgets. On the one hand spending 
cuts should not be made in policy areas which 
are absolutely necessary when it comes to en-
hancing competitiveness. This is especially 
true of expenditure on education. In this area 
spending cuts can lead to considerable follow-
up costs for the government, and they are coun-
ter-productive if one is trying to work towards 
the long-term stability of public finances. Se-
cond, the stabilization of government revenues 
should include an attempt to make the labour 
factor less expensive. In pay-as-you-earn soci-
al security systems the main financial burden 
tends to be placed on the labour factor, and this 
leads to high non-wage labour costs. Thus an 
employment-friendly approach to financing so-
cial security systems should focus to a far grea-
ter extent on production factors such as capital, 
the environment and natural resources, which 
should all be subject to higher taxation.
However, when it comes to enhancing the 
forces capable of generating growth, one must 
bear in mind that there are a number of eco-
nomic and ecological constraints. The global 
population is currently estimated to be about 
seven billion and over the next 40 years may 
well increase to more than nine billion. The 
impact of a growing population on the climate 
change issue and the problem of obtaining ac-
cess to natural resources will create a situation 
in which somewhere along the line the global 
economy will be confronted with insurmounta-
ble obstacles. This is why sustainable growth 
is characterized by environmentally-friendly 
and resource-efficient methods of production. 
The kind of structural transformation that is 
needed in order to embark on a path leading to 
sustainable growth can only be implemented 
if there are financial incentives. In this area 
one should primarily think in terms of high-
er taxes on activities which have an impact on 
the environment and utilize natural resources, 
i.e. by imposing an additional tax on CO2 emis-
sions. Such revenues would at the same time 
make a contribution to the consolidation of pu-
blic budgets.
When all is said and done greater economic 
growth can make a contribution to debt reduc-
tion because it leads to an increase in govern-
ment revenues and to lower levels of spending 
on measures designed to combat unemploy-
ment. But at the same time it is obvious that 
in some eurozone countries the level of indeb-
tedness has now reached a point where annual 
nominal economic growth of four percent is 
not enough in order to deal with the problem 
of public debt. In January 2012 the Kiel Ins-
titute for the World Economy published esti-
mates suggesting that even if such optimistic 
assumptions about growth are correct, a debt 
write-down of slightly more than 80 percent in 
Greece and of about 45 percent in Portugal is 
unavoidable. “Ireland, Italy and Hungary will 
be able to avoid a partial debt write-down only 
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if they attain high macroeconomic growth ra-
tes. The prospects for this are fairly good in 
Ireland” (Bencek and Klodt 2012). 
In realistic terms it is difficult to do anything 
about the fact that there will continue to be con-
siderable differences in productivity within the 
eurozone even if one were to intensify the mea-
sures designed to enhance the level of compe-
titiveness. It is currently impossible to assume 
that the adaptation mechanisms which are nee-
ded if a monetary union is to function properly 
(a high level of labour mobility and wage reduc-
tions) will come into effect in the eurozone in 
the foreseeable future. If these mechanisms do 
not come into play, a monetary union can only 
survive in the long run if the strong economies 
are willing to make transfer payments to the 
weak economies. This is the case in Germany 
within the framework of fiscal equalization 
among the federal states, and in the US, where 
about 30 percent of the expenditure of the sta-
tes is paid for by the federal government (see 
Becker 2011, p. 45). The precondition for this is 
greater economic policy integration, and this 
will make use of instruments such as tax equa-
lization payments and fiscal redistribution in 
the framework of common social security sys-
tems. The associated fiscal transfers constitute 
a replacement for the lack of labour mobility 
and the absence of factor price flexibility.
Joint liability of all eurozone states for public 
debt is another way of making transfer pay-
ments. It might be possible to introduce eu-
robonds or to conclude a debt reduction pact, 
which is what the “German Council of Econo-
mic Experts” suggests in its annual report for 
2011/12. Joint liability for debts of the eurozone 
states would certainly be advantageous, since 
risk surcharges would turn out to be less ex-
pensive. It would enable states which currently 
have low credit ratings and are faced with ha-
ving to pay high interest rates to significantly 
reduce their interest payments. At the same 
time joint liability would reduce the danger 
of insolvency in the case of individual states. 
Speculations about a forthcoming sovereign de-
fault would die down, and this would probably 
lead to a stabilization of the bond markets and 
of the euro. 
IV  
Support is better than failure
All of the eurozone countries must do what they 
can to resolve the European debt crisis. Initi-
ally a credible consolidation strategy can be im-
plemented only by each country acting on its 
own. The same is true when it comes to enhan-
cing international competitiveness. However, 
the highly indebted economies are coming up 
against the limits of what is possible and feasi-
ble. Without assistance from the economically 
more powerful nations they will be unable to 
deal with their very real economic problems 
and the public debt issue.
Source: own design © Bertelsmann Stiftung
Low productivity
The vicious circle of low 
competitiveness
Economic consequences for a member of a monetary 
union with productivity problems
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Consumption
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Sovereign debt
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Hitherto the German government has fought 
shy of cost-intensive measures and has prima-
rily insisted on drastic cost-cutting in the high-
ly indebted countries. However, this in itself 
will resolve neither the debt crisis nor the euro 
crisis. For this reason it is a fact that in one way 
or another Germany is going to have to make 
a financial contribution if it wishes to redress 
the economic and fiscal imbalances in Europe. 
If individual eurozone states were to become 
insolvent, losses would be incurred by the Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB) and the commercial 
banks. The same is true of debt write-downs. 
The losses incurred by the ECB and the cost 
of safety nets for banks the might become ne-
cessary will be borne by the German taxpayer. 
Estimates published by Spiegel Online indicate 
that total default by Greece would confront the 
German taxpayer with write-offs amounting to 
€60 billion, and this does not include the con-
tagious influence such an event might have on 
other ailing eurozone states (see Kwasniewski 
2012). The insolvency of one country will be 
bound to fuel speculation about the possible 
bankruptcy of other eurozone states, and ri-
sing interest rates will simply increase their 
indebtedness. Furthermore, sovereign default 
will lead to a catastrophic economic implosion 
in the country concerned, and this, on account 
of the degree of economic interrelatedness, will 
quickly spread to other European countries. 
Since it is an exporting nation, this would have 
a severe impact on Germany. A drop in exports 
would lead to a decline in employment, and this 
in turn would lead to lower government revenu-
es and higher government expenditure.
It thus follows that as far as German taxpayers 
are concerned the current crisis in the euro-
zone is going to cost them something whether 
they like it or not. However, if the crisis is go-
ing to cost something come what may, it makes 
more sense to use the money preventively in 
order to bolster economically weak countries 
and to prevent a collapse of government finan-
ces and the economy. These payments would 
in so many words be the price for stable econo-
mic conditions in Europe and the stabilization 
of the monetary union. This is of fundamental 
importance for Germany as an exporting nati-
on as it strives for job security and prosperity. 
The latest report by the German Council of Eco-
nomic Experts comes to clear-cut conclusions 
which deserve our unqualified support. “Ger-
many more than any other country has profited 
a great deal from the monetary union. . . . Tho-
se who wish to benefit from the advantages of 
open markets for goods and services will have 
to ensure, in the context of global financial and 
investment networks, that the instability ema-
nating from them does not cause serious dama-
ge to the real economy. Such protection is not 
going to be free” (SVR 2011, p. 2). 
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